Enriching Ethical Judgments in History Education
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[1] Victoria University of Wellington
Victoria University of Wellington
Nueva Zelanda
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[2] University of Alberta
University of Alberta
Canadá
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- Localización: Theory and research in social education, ISSN 0093-3104, Vol. 46, Vol. 3 (Vol.), 2018, págs. 449-479
- Idioma: inglés
- Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
- Dialnet Métricas: 7 Citas
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Resumen
This article explores the relationship between the philosophy of ethics, history education, and young people’s historical ethical judgments. In the last two decades, “ethical judgments,” which focus on making decisions about the ethics of historical actions, has been acknowledged as a second-order historical thinking concept in history education. Despite the expectation that history students should make reasoned and critically thoughtful historical ethical judgments, this aspect of history education is under-emphasized and under-theorized. In addition, the limited research available indicates that history teachers’ and students’ ethical judgments are often oversimplified because they focus on the conclusion about the rightness or wrongness of an action over the thought processes involved in arriving at a justified position.
Using refugee migration as an example of historical and contemporary controversy, we consider how the philosophy of ethics could enlarge the “ethical” in ethical judgment and offer history education a rich conceptual lens through which to explore making ethical judgments in, and about, the past. We argue that the kinds of questions, concepts, and lines of argument ethicists explore could better inform students’ historical ethical judgments by illuminating the contested landscape upon which ethical judgments rest.
