Resumen de The Non-Democratic Roots of Elite Capture: Evidence from Soeharto Mayors in Indonesia
Mónica Martínez Bravo, Priya Mukherjee, Andreas Stegmann
Democracies widely differ in the extent to which powerful elites and interest groups retain influence over politics. While a large literature argues that elite capture is rooted in a country's history, our understanding of the determinants of elite persistence is limited. In this paper, we show that the way in which democratic transitions unfold is a key determinant of the extent of elite capture. We exploit quasi-random variation that originated during the Indonesian transition: Soeharto-regime mayors were allowed to finish their terms before being replaced by new leaders. Since mayors' political cycles were not synchronized, this event generated exogenous variation in how long old-regime mayors remained in their position during the democratic transition. Districts with longer exposure to old-regime mayors experience worse governance outcomes, higher elite persistence, and lower political competition in the medium-run. The results suggest that slower transitions towards democracy allow the old-regime elites to capture democracy.
