The Non-Democratic Roots of Elite Capture: Evidence from Soeharto Mayors in Indonesia

• Monica Martinez-Bravo ^[2] ; Priya Mukherjee ^[1] ; Andreas Stegmann ^[2]
  1. [1] College of William & Mary

     College of William & Mary

     Estados Unidos

     
  2. [2] CEMFI
• Localización: Documentos de Trabajo ( CEMFI ), Nº. 1 (CEMFI Working Paper No. 1601, January 2016 (Revised May 2017)), 2016
• Idioma: inglés
• Enlaces
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• Resumen

  • Democracies widely differ in the extent to which powerful elites and interest groups retain influence over politics. While a large literature argues that elite capture is rooted in a country's history, our understanding of the determinants of elite persistence is limited. In this paper, we show that the way in which democratic transitions unfold is a key determinant of the extent of elite capture. We exploit quasi-random variation that originated during the Indonesian transition: Soeharto-regime mayors were allowed to finish their terms before being replaced by new leaders. Since mayors' political cycles were not synchronized, this event generated exogenous variation in how long old-regime mayors remained in their position during the democratic transition. Districts with longer exposure to old-regime mayors experience worse governance outcomes, higher elite persistence, and lower political competition in the medium-run. The results suggest that slower transitions towards democracy allow the old-regime elites to capture democracy.