Frege on subject matter and identity statements

• Autores: Eros Corazza, Kepa Korta Carrión
• Localización: Analysis, ISSN-e 1467-8284, Vol. 75, Nº. 4, 2015, págs. 562-565
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • In formulating the puzzle about cognitive significance in ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’, Frege rejects the approach he suggested in the Begriffsschrift on the ground that if the utterance of a sentence of the form a = b (e.g. ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’) is understood as ‘a’ and ‘b’ referring to the same object (i.e. they are co-referential) we lose the subject matter. In this note, we will show how Frege’s concerns can be understood and circumvented