Resumen de A normatively adequate credal reductivism
It is a prevalent, if not popular, thesis in the metaphysics of belief that facts about an agent�s beliefs depend entirely upon facts about that agent�s underlying credal state. Call this thesis �credal reductivism� and any view that endorses this thesis a �credal reductivist view�. An adequate credal reductivist view will accurately predict both when belief occurs and which beliefs are held appropriately, on the basis of credal facts alone. Several well-known�and some lesser known�objections to credal reductivism turn on the inability of standard credal reductivist views to get the latter, normative, results right. This paper presents and defends a novel credal reductivist view according to which belief is a type of �imprecise credence� that escapes these objections by including an extreme credence of 1.
