A normatively adequate credal reductivism

• Autores: Justin M. Dallmann
• Localización: Synthese, ISSN-e 1573-0964, Vol. 191, Nº. 10, 2014, págs. 2301-2313
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • It is a prevalent, if not popular, thesis in the metaphysics of belief that facts about an agent�s beliefs depend entirely upon facts about that agent�s underlying credal state. Call this thesis �credal reductivism� and any view that endorses this thesis a �credal reductivist view�. An adequate credal reductivist view will accurately predict both when belief occurs and which beliefs are held appropriately, on the basis of credal facts alone. Several well-known�and some lesser known�objections to credal reductivism turn on the inability of standard credal reductivist views to get the latter, normative, results right. This paper presents and defends a novel credal reductivist view according to which belief is a type of �imprecise credence� that escapes these objections by including an extreme credence of 1.