El salario a rendimiento en el sector de la construcción. Modelo para determinar el precio óptimo y el precio máximo a pagar por un trabajo a destajo

• Autores: Albert Ribera Roget
• Directores de la Tesis: Joquim de Ciurana Gay (dir. tes.)
• Lectura: En la Universitat de Girona ( España ) en 2013
• Idioma: español
• Tribunal Calificador de la Tesis: Josep Castellano Costa (presid.), Nelia Valverde Gascueña (secret.), María Paz Sáez Pérez (voc.)
• Materias:
  • Ciencias económicas
    • Economía sectorial
      • Construcción
• Enlaces
  • Tesis en acceso abierto en: TDX
• Resumen

  • This doctoral thesis explores HR management through systems of production incentives in the construction sector which has been instrumental to the Spanish economy. The transformation of a time-based payment system to a performance or production-based payment system is difficult if you consider the complexity of the calculation and the environment in which prices are negotiated. In any case, before agreeing to a piece-rate determined price it is imperative that the person responsible for negotiating on behalf of the company knows the relationship of this piece rate compared to expected labour costs as an objective in the opening plans. The main objective of this thesis is to propose an algorithm in flowchart form that facilitates —from the data found in the costs study— knowledge about the price range within which the economic incentive for piece-rate compensation for any work should be established by applying a few simple conversion coefficients proposed by the model itself