You don’t say! Lying, asserting and insincerity

• Autores: Neri Marsili
• Directores de la Tesis: Jennifer Saul (dir. tes.), Paul Faulkner (dir. tes.)
• Lectura: En la University of Sheffield ( Reino Unido ) en 2018
• Idioma: inglés
• Enlaces
  • Tesis en acceso abierto en: etheses.whiterose.ac.uk
• Resumen

  • This thesis addresses philosophical problems concerning improper assertions. The first part considers the issue of defining lying: here, against a standard view, I argue that a lie need not intend to deceive the hearer. I define lying as an insincere assertion, and then resort to speech act theory to develop a detailed account of what an assertion is, and what can make it insincere. Even a sincere assertion, however, can be improper (e.g., it can be false, or unwarranted): in the second part of the thesis, I consider these kinds of impropriety. An influential hypothesis maintains that proper assertions must meet a precise epistemic standard, and several philosophers have tried to identify this standard. After reviewing some difficulties for this approach, I provide an innovative solution to some known puzzles concerning this problem. In my view, assertions purport to aim at truth, but they are not subject to a norm that requires speakers to assert a proposition only if it is true.