Naturalness, amelioration, and sex
- Autores: Iñigo Valero Alzaga
- Directores de la Tesis: María de Ponte Azcárate (dir. tes.), Daniel López de Sa Medina (codir. tes.), Genoveva Martí Campillo (tut. tes.)
- Lectura: En la Universitat de Barcelona ( España ) en 2022
- Idioma: inglés
- Tribunal Calificador de la Tesis: Mona Simion (presid.), Manuel Martínez Merino (secret.), David Ludwig (voc.)
- Programa de doctorado: Programa de Doctorado en Ciencia Cognitiva y Lenguaje por la Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona; la Universidad de Barcelona y la Universidad Rovira i Virgili
- Materias:
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- Resumen
This PhD Dissertation explores a variety of topics in relation with metaphysical naturalness and the assessment of our conceptual and classificatory practices. It is divided in three self-standing—albeit connected—papers. In the first paper, “Radical Projectibilism: A Gradual Account of Natural Kindness”, I introduce an original account of naturalness according to which the naturalness of kinds is to be identified with their degree of projectibility. A distinctive characteristic of this proposal—which I label Radical Projectibilism—is that, by identifying naturalness with a gradual property such as projectibility, the notion of naturalness itself becomes one of degree. I argue that understanding naturalness in a gradual way not only appropriately counters the relevant notion of arbitrariness but, moreover, brings important advantages over dichotomic alternatives. In the second paper, “Ameliorating at the Joints. A Permissive Normative Framework for Conceptual Engineering”, I defend an original normative framework for conceptual amelioration. I do so through a reply to a recent proposal by Mona Simion (2017) who articulates an “epistemic limiting procedure” for conceptual revision according to which it is not permissible to ameliorate concepts if the revision involves an “epistemic loss”. I argue, instead, for a more permissive alternative that allows for epistemic losses, provided they are duly compensated by the moral or pragmatic gains that motivate the revision. Finally, in the third paper, “Is Sex Binary? Yes and No, and a Terminological Proposal”, I engage a specific case study involving sex categories. I argue that, appearances notwithstanding, the current dispute on the binary or non-binary nature of sex does not involve a factual disagreement. Moreover, I advance a terminological normative proposal according to which ‘binary’ should be replaced by ‘dimorphic’ in the characterization of sex. The main reason in favor of this move, I argue, is that ‘dimorphic’ preserves the important function that ‘binary’ presumably fulfils while avoiding the problems of its counterpart.
