On the leaks and boundaries of imagination

• Autores: Andrea Rivadulla Duró
• Directores de la Tesis: Josep Macià Fàbrega (dir. tes.), Manuel García-Carpintero (codir. tes.)
• Lectura: En la Universitat de Barcelona ( España ) en 2022
• Idioma: inglés
• Tribunal Calificador de la Tesis: Kourken Michaelian (presid.), Jordi Fernàndez Martínez (secret.), Eric Mandelbaum (voc.)
• Programa de doctorado: Programa de Doctorado en Ciencia Cognitiva y Lenguaje por la Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona; la Universidad de Barcelona y la Universidad Rovira i Virgili
• Materias:
  • Psicología
    • Psicopedagogía
      • Procesos cognitivos
    • Psicología experimental
      • Procesos de la memoria
  • Filosofía
    • Antropología filosófica
      • Filosofía de la acción
      • Filosofía de la imaginación
• Enlaces
  • Tesis en acceso abierto en: TDX
• Resumen

  • The present dissertation explores the role of imagination in different philosophical domains of inquiry. The thesis set out as a collection of self- standing essays and can be divided into two parts: leaks of imagination and boundaries of imagination. The first part concerns what I name leaks of imagination: Effects imagination has on attitudes and behavior. In Chapter 1, I review clinical and empirical evidence on the consequences imagining experiences has. To account for this evidence, I propose a theory—the Prima Facie View—and argue for the implicit assertoric force of imagination. According to this view, experiential imagination is not epistemically innocuous. Chapter 2 concerns the role of imagination in intrinsic symbolic actions. I argue that these actions elude an explanation in terms of a belief- desire pair or an emotion, and characterize them as symbolically displaced imaginings. The second part of the thesis, boundaries of imagination, delimits the appeal to the imagination. Chapter 3 criticizes the appeal to the imagination to explain the functional profile of delusions. This criticism is followed by a positive doxastic account of delusions in a fragmented and psychofunctional system of belief. Chapter 4 examines the Simulation Theory of Memory, which reduces episodic memory to imagination. I argue that given the way it equates episodic memory with imagination, the theory is in a compromised position to account for the characteristic phenomenology of episodic memory, and thus for its reliability. Overall, in this dissertation, I present a critical overview of four independent fields and propose new accounts of the problems at hand.