Animal personhood: a legal and moral defense
- Autores: Macarena Montes Franceschini
- Directores de la Tesis: Paula Casal Ribas (dir. tes.)
- Lectura: En la Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( España ) en 2022
- Idioma: español
- Tribunal Calificador de la Tesis: Jefferson Allen McMahan (presid.), Lori Gruen (secret.), Kristen Stilt (voc.)
- Programa de doctorado: Programa de Doctorado en Derecho por la Universidad Pompeu Fabra
- Materias:
- Enlaces
- Tesis en acceso abierto en: TDX
- Resumen
- español
La tesis defiende la plausibilidad de la personalidad de los animales no humanos desde una perspectiva legal y moral. Ofrece una defensa ecuménica al argumentar que los animales pueden ser considerados personas desde posiciones teóricas muy diferentes, incluso rivales. Comienza documentando los orígenes y la evolución de los conceptos de persona y personalidad, repasando las ideas asociadas a estos términos desde la Antigüedad. Este análisis demuestra que la noción de persona que empleo ha sido ampliamente utilizada en varias profesiones, en lugar de inventada para propósitos actuales. Esta investigación histórica produce una lista de rasgos de la personalidad, la mayoría de los cuales son científicamente verificables, por ejemplo, utilizando la prueba del espejo de Gallup. Habiendo reunido esta lista y discutido sus elementos, propongo entender la personalidad como un concepto racimo, definido en términos de una lista ponderada de criterios relacionados, ninguno de los cuales es necesario ni suficiente. También discuto rasgos no verificables, como la posesión de un alma, que contienen elementos no meramente descriptivos, sino también evaluativos. A continuación, ofrezco una taxonomía sobre lo que han argumentado los filósofos morales respecto de las implicaciones normativas de la personalidad. Volviendo al derecho, demuestro que los animales pueden ser considerados como personas según cinco concepciones y sostengo que los animales poseen los atributos de la personalidad, que al menos los sistemas jurídicos provenientes de la tradición continental francesa asocian a la persona. Finalmente, examino treinta y dos casos sobre la personalidad de los animales, principalmente habeas corpus, definiendo algunas tendencias comunes, conclusiones y dilemas a superar al litigar ante los tribunales.
- English
The thesis explores the idea that a nonhuman animal can be considered a person from a moral or a legal point of view. I shall be attempting an ecumenical defense of this possibility, for I believe that the idea that an animal can be a person is something that can and should be accepted from a wide variety of positions and does not require our holding unusual or sectarian theories on some particular matters such as the relationship between law and morality, the ethical implications of personhood or any particular theory of rights.
The thesis defends the plausibility of nonhuman animal personhood from a legal and moral perspective. It offers an ecumenical defense as it argues that animals can be considered persons from very different, even rival, theoretical positions. Chapter One begins by documenting the origins and evolution of the concepts of the person and personhood, surveying the ideas associated with these terms since Antiquity. This analysis shows that the notion of personhood I employ has been widely used in various professions rather than fabricated for present purposes. This historical research yields a list of the marks of personhood, most of which are scientifically verifiable, for example, using Gallup’s mirror test, which are examined in Chapter Two. Having gathered this list and discussed its elements, I propose understanding personhood as a cluster concept defined in terms of a weighted list of related criteria, none of which are necessary or sufficient. In Chapter Three, I also discuss non-verifiable traits such as soul possession, which already contain not merely descriptive, but also evaluative elements. I then offer a taxonomy of what moral philosophers have argued are the normative implications of personhood. Turning to law, in Chapter Four and Five, I demonstrate that animals can be considered legal persons according to five conceptions of the legal person, and argue that animals possess the attributes of personality that at least the legal systems of French continental law associate with personhood. Finally, in Chapter Six and Seven, I examine thirty-two cases on animal legal personhood, mainly writs of habeas corpus, defining some common trends, findings, and dilemmas to overcome when litigating in court.
My most important conclusion is that there is no insurmountable legal or ethical objection to the view I want to defend: that some animals may be considered persons from a moral and legal point of view. The main obstacles are not theoretical, but they emerge from the fear of a slippery slope and the fear that important and trivial but popular human interests may be set back if we grant members of other species, not just moral but legal rights.
- español
