Resumen de La respuesta del legislador a las declaraciones de inconstitucionalidad en el ordenamiento español
- español
En este trabajo se pretende dar respuesta a la cuestión, enunciada en su título, de si el legislador español puede responder a una declaración de inconstitucionalidad acordada por el Tribunal Constitucional. Esta respuesta del legislador a las declaraciones de inconstitucionalidad tiene su contexto teórico en el marco de la llamada objeción contramayoritaria. Si un Estado está dotado con una constitución rígida y controlada por los jueces, la decisión definitiva recaerá siempre en estos últimos, obligando al legislador a optar por una gravosa reforma constitucional si quiere imponer su interpretación del Texto Fundamental.
No obstante, la principal conclusión a la que hemos llegado en este trabajo es que el legislador no puede aprobar una norma con rango de ley o acto parlamentario que venga a reiterar o a dar efectos a otra norma con rango de ley o acto parlamentario previamente depurados por una sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional. Esta prohibición es lo que hemos llamado el veto a la respuesta del legislador a una declaración de inconstitucionalidad.
En primer lugar, se analizan las paradojas a las que se enfrenta la objeción contramayoritaria. En segundo lugar, se establece la principal premisa de la que parte la conclusión: la supremacía normativa de la Constitución Española. Es la norma fundamental y fundante del ordenamiento constitucional español, es la fuente de las fuentes del derecho y afirma su supremacía sin excepciones, estableciendo la sujeción de todos los ciudadanos y poderes públicos a su texto, algo que ni siquiera la integración en la Unión Europea ha puesto en duda. En tercer lugar, se analiza la posición que el legislador tiene en el ordenamiento jurídico, así como su capacidad para dar lugar a una respuesta a una declaración de inconstitucionalidad. En este sentido, el legislador, independientemente de las transformaciones que ha sufrido el ejercicio de la potestad legislativa, es el intérprete primario de la Constitución, tiene atribuido a su favor el monopolio normativo primario; y tiene libertad de configuración a la hora de desarrollar la Constitución. En cuarto lugar, se analiza la posición del Tribunal Constitucional y de los efectos generales que el artículo 164.1 de la Constitución predica de sus sentencias: La nulidad como efecto erga omnes de las sentencias del Tribunal Constitucional no puede ser asimilada en sus efectos a la fuerza de ley o a la derogación. La expulsión de las normas inconstitucionales se hace con efectos ex tunc y no desde la fecha de la sentencia, con independencia de que el Tribunal Constitucional tenga cierta capacidad de modular los efectos de sus sentencias. Del mismo modo, la anulación de una norma inconstitucional despliega hacia el futuro efectos que van más allá de la lógica imposibilidad de aplicar una norma expulsada: prohíbe reintroducir el mandato normativo anulado en la sentencia si no es a través de una reforma de la Constitución. No obstante, el Tribunal Constitucional no es un legislador y su labor está sujeta a límites, entre los que destaca la necesidad de fundamentar sus decisiones en la propia Constitución.
Se concluye con un análisis de las herramientas presentes en nuestro ordenamiento para hacer eficaz el veto a la respuesta del legislador: la posibilidad ya explorada del amparo frente a la admisión de iniciativas parlamentarias por parte de la Mesa; una propuesta descentralizadora del control de constitucionalidad de las leyes que permitiera a los jueces inaplicar aquellas leyes afectadas por el veto, así como la posibilidad de que a través del incidente de ejecución de sentencias del Tribunal Constitucional se puedan declarar la nulidad de leyes y disposiciones afectadas por el mencionado veto.
This work aims to answer a question: if the Spanish legislature can answer a declaration of unconstitutionality agreed by the Constitutional Court. Such response of the legislature has its theoretical context in the so-called counter-majority objection. If a State has a rigid constitution and a system of judicial review, the final decision will always rest in the judges, forcing the legislature to opt for a burdensome constitutional reform to impose its interpretation of the Constitution.
However, the main conclusion of this work is that the legislature cannot approve a law or parliamentary act that reiterate or give effect to another law or parliamentary act previously declared as unconstitutional. This prohibition is what we have called the legislature response veto to a declaration of unconstitutionality.
In first place, the paradoxes faced by the counter-majority objection are analyzed. Secondly, the main premise of the conclusión of this work is established: the normativity and supremacy of the Spanish Constitution. It is the fundamental and founding law of the Spanish constitutional order, it is the source of the sources of law and affirms its supremacy without exceptions, establishing the subjection of all citizens and public powers, something that not even the integration into the European Union has questioned. Thirdly, the position that the legislature has in the legal system is analyzed, as well as its capacity to response a declaration of unconstitutionality. In this sense, the legislature, despite the modern transformations of the legislative power, is the primary interpreter of the Constitution, it has the primary normative monopoly and freedom of configuration in the development of the Constitution. Fourth, we analyzed the position of the Constitutional Court and the general effects that article 164.1 of the Constitution confers to its sentences: Nullity as an erga omnes effect of the Constitutional Court sentences cannot be assimilated to the law or its derogation. The removal of unconstitutional laws its done with ex tunc effects and not since the date of the sentence. In the same way, the nullity of an unconstitutional law has future effects that go beyond the logical impossibility of applying an expelled norm: forbids the reintroduction of the legal mandate annulled in the sentence if not through a reform of the Constitution. However, the Constitutional Court is not a legislature and its power is subject to limits, mainly the need to support its decisions on the Constitution itself.
The work concludes with an overview of the assets to make effective the legislature response veto: the already explored possibility of the amparo remedy before de Constitutuional Court against the admission of parliamentary initiatives by the Parliament's Bureau; a decentralizing proposal for the judicial review that would allow judges to inapply the laws affected by the veto, as well as the possibility of repeal the laws and provisions affected by de the veto through the incident of execution of sentences of the Constitutional Court.
- English
This work aims to answer a question: if the Spanish legislature can answer a declaration of unconstitutionality agreed by the Constitutional Court. Such response of the legislature has its theoretical context in the so-called counter-majority objection. If a State has a rigid constitution and a system of judicial review, the final decision will always rest in the judges, forcing the legislature to opt for a burdensome constitutional reform to impose its interpretation of the Constitution.
However, the main conclusion of this work is that the legislature cannot approve a law or parliamentary act that reiterate or give effect to another law or parliamentary act previously declared as unconstitutional. This prohibition is what we have called the legislature response veto to a declaration of unconstitutionality.
In first place, the paradoxes faced by the counter-majority objection are analyzed. Secondly, the main premise of the conclusión of this work is established: the normativity and supremacy of the Spanish Constitution. It is the fundamental and founding law of the Spanish constitutional order, it is the source of the sources of law and affirms its supremacy without exceptions, establishing the subjection of all citizens and public powers, something that not even the integration into the European Union has questioned. Thirdly, the position that the legislature has in the legal system is analyzed, as well as its capacity to response a declaration of unconstitutionality. In this sense, the legislature, despite the modern transformations of the legislative power, is the primary interpreter of the Constitution, it has the primary normative monopoly and freedom of configuration in the development of the Constitution. Fourth, we analyzed the position of the Constitutional Court and the general effects that article 164.1 of the Constitution confers to its sentences: Nullity as an erga omnes effect of the Constitutional Court sentences cannot be assimilated to the law or its derogation. The removal of unconstitutional laws its done with ex tunc effects and not since the date of the sentence. In the same way, the nullity of an unconstitutional law has future effects that go beyond the logical impossibility of applying an expelled norm: forbids the reintroduction of the legal mandate annulled in the sentence if not through a reform of the Constitution. However, the Constitutional Court is not a legislature and its power is subject to limits, mainly the need to support its decisions on the Constitution itself.
The work concludes with an overview of the assets to make effective the legislature response veto: the already explored possibility of the amparo remedy before de Constitutuional Court against the admission of parliamentary initiatives by the Parliament's Bureau; a decentralizing proposal for the judicial review that would allow judges to inapply the laws affected by the veto, as well as the possibility of repeal the laws and provisions affected by de the veto through the incident of execution of sentences of the Constitutional Court.
