Resumen de Grounding legal reality
In this dissertation, I have defended a view on the relationship between metaphysical grounding and supervenience, and provided a comprehensive application of grounding theory to the philosophy of law. In Chapter 1, I have argued that a supervenience relation interestingly weaker than necessitation can be used to capture a substantive connection between grounding and modality. In Chapter 2, I have argued that metaphysical grounding is the relation of dependence that connects legal facts to their more basic determinants, and that the positivism/anti-positivism debate in legal philosophy involves competing claims on the grounds of legal facts. In Chapter 3, I have criticized the main extant grounding-based formulations of legal positivism, and offered a novel and insightful formulation that is capable of solving their problems. Finally, in Chapter 4, I have shown that Hume’s Law – the thesis that one cannot derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ – poses no significant threat to legal positivism or moral naturalism, when both are understood as views about grounding.
