The aim of this work is to study some aspects of the intersector labor movement. We study two sectors: formal and shadow. Formal sector trades legal goods with regulated economic activities. The shadow sector, instead, trades legal and illegal goods with unregulated economic activities. If the goods are legal then the shadow sector is informal. It is illegal otherwise. We would like to shed light as to the effects of some government policies on the transition of workers from one sector to the other. In the first chapter we construct an undirected search model with exogenous enforcement. In the second chapter we construct a directed search and matching model with endogenous enforcement effort. Finally, the third chapter studies the intersector labor movement in an open economy with illegal immigration. One of the key contributions of these three chapters is to remark the importance of the deterrence policy on the shadow sector. Improvements in the monitory rates make both fiscal policy and unemployment subsidies more efficient policies to reduce the amount of workers going shadow.
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