Three essays on corporate governance

• Autores: Stephen Joel Smulowitz
• Directores de la Tesis: Pascual Berrone (dir. tes.), John Almandoz Ríos (codir. tes.)
• Lectura: En la Universidad de Navarra ( España ) en 2017
• Idioma: español
• Tribunal Calificador de la Tesis: Fabrizio Ferraro (presid.), Massimo Maoret (secret.), Alejandro Escribá Esteve (voc.), Ruth V. Aguilera Vaqués (voc.), Juan Santaló Mediavilla (voc.)
• Programa de doctorado: Programa de Doctorado en Ciencias de la Dirección por la Universidad de Navarra
• Materias:
  • Ciencias económicas
    • Organización y dirección de empresas
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• Resumen

  • Three Essays on Corporate Governance RESUMEN My dissertations examines some of the unintended consequences of corporate governance choices. The first chapter in my dissertation examines the effect of CEO pay schemes on the probability of wrongdoing in banks. Different elements of CEO pay can affect the CEO’s motivation and attention to risk management differently, thereby affecting the opportunity to commit wrongdoing. Moreover, perceived inequity in the firm can moderate this relationship. Using a sample of U.S. banks from 2007-2013, I show that CEO option pay increases the likelihood of wrongdoing, and a high pay gap moderates this relationship, increasing the probability of wrongdoing when the opportunity is high. Our theoretical framework explains an inverted U-shape effect for restricted stock pay.

    The second chapter examines the effect of pay schemes on firm failure in banks close to failure. Building on the Behavioral Agency Model (BAM) I relax agency theory’s assumption of stable risk preferences, and describe how this change affects risk-taking for managers in firms close to failure. Using samples drawn from U.S. banks from 2006-2014, I show that CEO total pay and the individual elements of pay increase a firm’s propensity to fail. I provide evidence that fraud mediates the relationship between CEO pay and failure. I also show how this effect is ameliorated for firms with a community orientation.

    The third chapter examines the effect of institutional logics on board turnover. Building on insights from institutional theory and the literature on conflict, I examine how logic compatibility and resource dependence will affect turnover in bank boards of directors. I show that logic compatibility decreases turnover, and that resource dependence increases turnover. I also show that board turnover is greatest in organizations with both low compatibility and high resource dependence.