Essays in microeconomics
- Autores: Tahir OZTURK
- Directores de la Tesis: Guillaume Haeringer (dir. tes.)
- Lectura: En la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona ( España ) en 2008
- Idioma: español
- Tribunal Calificador de la Tesis: Carmen Beviá Baeza (presid.), Doh-Shin Jeon (secret.), Marco van der Leij (voc.)
- Materias:
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- Resumen
The thesis contains three independent research papers about different subjects in microeconomics. Although those papers belong to different fields such as public economics or industrial organization, they have an important intersection. The consequences of externalities, which may arise because of the decision, interrelation or only the existence of others, is the core of the analysis of the three papers. Each paper, in different contexts, studies the implications of others on agents# decisions.
The second chapter focuses into the analysis of jurisdictions# consolidation decision to provide a public facility in a society where both the location and the beneficiaries# composition of the public good influence the utility level of the individuals. It is stated under which conditions jurisdictions are more keen to consolidate, for different voting rules, and when consolidation improves the total utility of the society. With preferences over beneficiaries# composition, the location decision of a social planner and the free riding decision of minority are affected. When a jurisdiction cares more about the composition of the public goods# beneficiaries, social planner#s location decision for the public good changes in a way that makes that jurisdiction worse off. Moreover, minorities become keener to provide their own public good even though they have the free-riding option The third chapter analyzes two sided markets with sequential interaction. Specifically we inspect the consequences of the platform#s ability to deviate from its initial pricing strategy and its ability to treat different buyer and seller populations differently. It is shown the effects of seller and platform foresight on pricing behaviour and it is also considered a two sided market composed by two different populations of buyers. We provide a set of conditions on buyers# heterogeneity and for each case we provide conditions under which the monopoly platform, when it has the option to treat agents sequentially, chooses to do so against the alternative of sticking to a single stage pricing strategy. It is shown that the platform might not choose to differentiate prices for separable different buyer populations, as opposed to the usual monopoly case in a one sided market in which monopoly always favors discrimination.
In the fourth chapter, a model of multiple bilateral conflicts is introduced through a network structure where opponents invest in specific conflict technology to attack their respective rivals and defend their own resources. For a general specification of this conflict game there exists a unique equilibrium where each opponent invests positive amounts into conflict technology directed against all its respective rivals. Total conflict intensity, measured as aggregated equilibrium investment into all bilateral conflicts, depends on the underlying network characteristics. We analyze three specific but general classes of conflict structures (regular, star-shaped, and bipartite conflict networks) and show that peaceful resolution of bilateral conflicts, interpreted as dissolving conflictive links, induces a decrease in conflict intensity for the conflict classes considered. Additionally, a negative relation between individual conflict investment and network centrality can be established for those classes. Extending the analysis to general irregular networks illustrates the limits of this approach because peaceful bilateral conflict resolution might in some cases induce an increase in conflict intensity. The derived results have implications for peaceful resolutions of conflicts because neglecting the fact that opponents are embedded into an interrelated conflict structure might have adverse consequences for conflict intensity.
