Essays of corporate governance and cartel prosecution

• Autores: Daniel Ferrés Otegui
• Directores de la Tesis: Gaizka Ormazábal Sánchez (dir. tes.)
• Lectura: En la Universidad de Navarra ( España ) en 2014
• Idioma: español
• Tribunal Calificador de la Tesis: Xavier Vives (presid.), Mireia Giné (secret.), Filippo Ippolito (voc.), José Luis Peydró Alcalde (voc.), Javier Gomez Biscarri (voc.)
• Materias:
  • Ciencias económicas
    • Organización y dirección de empresas
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• Resumen

  • This dissertation comprises two papers on the reputational incentives arising from cartel prosecution and how these incentives affect outside directors behavior and firm decisions. In the first paper, I examine the consequences of cartel prosecution on outside director's reputation and the ex post behavior induced by this reputational loss. I test whether independent directors serving in cartel firms undergo reputational losses after cartel prosecution.

    Building on the evidence of antitrust-related reputational damage presented in the first paper, in the second papaer I analyze whether outside directors of cartel firms take specific ex ante actions to minimize potential reputational losses.