Resumen de Strategic offering and equilibria in electricity markets with stepwise supply offer curves
This PhD Dissertation analyses strategic offering and equilibria in a pool-based network-constrained electricity market. First, we address the problem faced by a single power producer that seeks to maximize its expected profit by the optimal selection of its stepwise offering strategy. This problem is formulated as an MPEC that accounts for the clearing of the market. Market uncertainties are modeled via scenarios. The resulting MPEC can be transformed into an equivalent mixed-integer linear problem that can be efficiently solved.
Then, we provide a methodology to characterize equilibria in a pool where several producers offer using strategically selected stepwise supply functions. The problem is formulated as an EPEC, which results from the joint consideration of several MPECs, one per strategic producer. The EPEC is characterized by all MPECs¿ strong stationarity conditions. These conditions are reduced to an equivalent mixed-integer linear problem that allows obtaining the stationary solutions of the EPEC.
Illustrative examples and realistic case studies are considered in order to illustrate the interest of the proposed formulations.
