Asserting as Commitment to Knowing. An Essay on the Normativity of Assertion

• Autores: Ivan Milic
• Directores de la Tesis: Manuel García-Carpintero (codir. tes.), Sven Rosenkranz (codir. tes.)
• Lectura: En la Universitat de Barcelona ( España ) en 2016
• Idioma: español
• Tribunal Calificador de la Tesis: Sanford G. Golberg (presid.), Josep Macià Fàbrega (secret.), Patrick Greenough (voc.)
• Programa de doctorado: Programa Oficial de Doctorado en Filosofía Analítica
• Materias:
  • Filosofía
    • Antropología filosófica
      • Filosofía del lenguaje
• Enlaces
  • Tesis en acceso abierto en:  TDX  Dipòsit Digital de la UB 
• Resumen

  • In this thesis, I propose and defend a theory according to which committing oneself to knowing the proposition expressed counts as an assertion of that proposition. A consequence of this view is the knowledge account of assertion, according to which one asserts that p correctly only if one knows that p. In support of this approach, I offer a strategy of identifying an assertion’s “normative consequences”, types of act that normally take place as a result of one’s making an assertion incorrectly. I outline two such phenomena: retraction and disavowal of knowledge. In continuation, I put the theory to test and critically examine four sets of objections against it, arguing that it can convincingly defuse them. Finally, I discuss two related issues: I maintain that by performing “aesthetic assertions” one also normally performs a non-assertoric speech act of recommendation, and argue for the possibility of “non-linguistic assertions”, whose content is expressed by gestures in appropriate contexts.