págs. 1-14
Purely Physical Explananda: Bistability in Perception
págs. 17-34
págs. 35-57
págs. 59-88
págs. 91-109
págs. 111-130
An Ensemble-Plus-Standing-For Account of Scientific Representation: No Need for (Unnecessary) Abstract Objects
págs. 133-149
The Nature of Scientific Models: Abstract Artifacts That Determine Fictional Systems
págs. 151-171
págs. 173-195
págs. 197-219
Fictional Co-identification: The Explanatory Lightweight of Realism
págs. 223-237
What Is the Difference Between Hamlet and Me?: Fiction, Metaphysics and the Nature of Our Moral Thinking
págs. 239-253
Friederike Moltmann
págs. 255-276
págs. 277-294
págs. 297-318
Methodology in the Ontology of Artworks: Exploring Hermeneutic Fictionalism
págs. 319-337
A Realist-Friendly Argument for Moral Fictionalism: Perhaps You'd Better Not Believe It
págs. 339-356
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