The Conserved Quantity Theory Defended

• Autores: Dowe Phil
• Localización: Theoria: an international journal for theory, history and foundations of science, ISSN 0495-4548, Vol. 15, Nº 37, 2000, págs. 11-31
• Idioma: español
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• Resumen

  • I defend the conserved quantity theory of causation against two objections: firstly, that to tie the notion of "cause"to conservation laws is impossible, circular or metaphysically counterintuitive ; and secondly, that the conser quantity theory entails an undesired notion of identity through time. My defence makes use of an important meta-philosophical distinction between empirical analysis and conceptual analysis. My claim is that the conserved quantity theory of causation must be understood primarily as an empirical, not a conceptual, analysis of causation.