Niveles de lenguaje, autorreferencia y las paradojas

• Autores: Jesús Padilla Gálvez
• Localización: Contextos, ISSN 0212-6192, Nº 17-18, 1991, págs. 121-148
• Idioma: español
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• Resumen

  • S. Kripke has motivated and modelled a truth-value gap solution to the Liar paradox. Setting forth the classical Tarskian account in a simple and elegant self-referential language, we will obtain some classical Tarskian results. We then modify the self-referential language successively to model the truth-value gap solutions mentioned above. These solutions depend on the semantic notion of groundedness. We argue against these truth-value gap solutions by giving informal semantical counterexamples and reproducing revenge problems for each that are more troublesome than the usual Strengthened Liar.