In connection with the opposition between those who uphold that scientific method must be based in the logic of discovery and justification and those who do not admit the existence of a universal and steady method that operates as a fixed standard pattern, what we are trying to defend in this article is that the great value of scientific method consists of not trying to achieve definite results and, at the same time, of being capable of changing its rules in order to obtain a major rationality and the free exercise of research, whenever it allows the control over subjective decisions. The critical method must permit the analytical and hermeneutical approaches to keep their complementarity. The dialectics of natural sciences/social sciences, explanation/comprehension, analytic knowledge/hermeneutical knowledge, must find a domain of explanation within the semiotic limits of a community of men of science, or of communication, which allows an intersubjective agreement.
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