Referring to Nothing

• Bueno, Otávio ^[1]
  1. [1] University of Miami

     University of Miami

     Estados Unidos

     
• Localización: Principia: an international journal of epistemology, ISSN-e 1808-1711, Vol. 28, Nº. Extra 3, 2024 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Special Issue: 13th Principia International Symposium; 505–516)
• Idioma: inglés
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Resumen

  • Typical accounts of reference demand that referring terms denote existent objects. This assumption is shared by theories across a variety of areas of philosophy, in particular, direct reference views in philosophy of language; neo-Fregean conceptions in the philosophy of mathematics, and easy-ontology approaches in metaphysics. In this paper, this assumption is resisted and the significance and the possibility of referring to the nonexistent is highlighted. After identifying difficulties in all these three theories and resisting a free-logic approach, ontologically neutral quantifiers, which do not require the existence of what is quantified over, are suggested as providing a better conception. It is concluded that the difficulties raised to the previous theories do not affect the ontologically neutral approach, while the approach, properly conceived, allows for nonexistent objects to have properties.