Manufacturer Encroachment on a Sustainable Supply Chain under: Asymmetric Green Information

• Yufei Hu ^[1] ; Xiaorong Du ^[1] ; Lianghua Chen ^[2]
  1. [1] Hohai University

     Hohai University

     China

     
  2. [2] Southeast University

     Southeast University

     China

     
• Localización: Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research, ISSN-e 0718-1876, Vol. 19, Nº. 3, 2024, págs. 2114-2138
• Idioma: inglés
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen

  • This paper investigates manufacturer encroachment on a sustainable supply chain, where the manufacturer holds exclusive information on product greenness and is responsible for both corporate social responsibility (CSR) and greening. The manufacturer and the retailer play a signaling game whereby CSR effort and wholesale price serve as joint green signals. Findings reveal that, firstly, encroachment induces higher CSR efforts from manufacturers. When customers exhibit a strong CSR preference, the resulting CSR increment leads to increased offline demand and drives up both wholesale and retail prices in a mutually beneficial manner. This phenomenon is referred to as the CSR effect, yielding a win-win encroachment. Secondly, when signaling product greenness to highly CSR-sensitive customers, the high-greenness manufacturer principally distorts her CSR effort downward to an extent unprofitable for the low-greenness manufacturer to mimic and subordinately distorts the wholesale price downward to counter CSR-induced demand decrement and mitigate CSR cost pass-through downstream. Finally, the win-win encroachment pattern is characterized by encroachment profit and signal expense sharing, with encroachment strengthening downwarddistorted signaling while signaling weakens the CSR effect. These insights contribute valuable guidance for green manufacturers in CSR decision-making, which functions as a component of green signaling and facilitates transitioning to dual-channel sustainable supply chains.