La satisfacción de las preferencias y los límites del utilitarismo

• Martín D. Farrell ^[1]
  1. [1] Universidad de Buenos Aires

     Universidad de Buenos Aires

     Argentina

     
• Localización: Telos: Revista iberoamericana de estudios utilitaristas, ISSN-e 2255-596X, ISSN 1132-0877, Vol. 4, Nº. 1 (Junio), 1995, págs. 41-50
• Idioma: español
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• Resumen

  • Sidgwick's Principie says that it we consider sorne results as are commonly judged to be good we can find nothing that appears to possess this quality of goodness out of relation to human existence.

    There are three ways in wich this principie can be considered: a) accepting it recognizes sorne things as valuable independently of their contribution to the value of anyone's life: b) accepting a conterfactual preference-satisfaction theory, which claims that what is valuable is what would satisfy on e's preferences in sorne privileged epistemic position, and c) accepting a theory which considers fair a certain distribution of income although its value does not rest on its being good for particular individuals.

    Any theory that disregards Sidgwick's Principie is outside the limits of utilitarianism.