A note on Mcgee’s counterexample to Modus Ponens

• Rubin, Mariela ^[1]
  1. [1] Universidad de Buenos Aires

     Universidad de Buenos Aires

     Argentina

     
• Localización: Principia: an international journal of epistemology, ISSN-e 1808-1711, Vol. 28, Nº. Extra 1, 2024 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Special Issue: What can we do in Philosophy using Logic?)
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • In this article I will review McGee's famous counterexample to Modus Ponens and I will argue that it is not a real counterexample. I will claim that the problem lies in an infelicitous assertion of the second premise. As result of this diagnosis, I will suggest that when dealing with indicative conditionals a pragmatic theory is needed.