The logic and Philosophy of so-called moral and semantic Innocence

Soutif, Ludovic ^[1] ; Pontes, André Nascimento ^[2]
1. [1] Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro
  
  Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro
  
  Brasil
2. [2] Universidade Federal do Amazonas
  
  Universidade Federal do Amazonas
  
  Brasil
Localización: Principia: an international journal of epistemology, ISSN-e 1808-1711, Vol. 28, Nº. Extra 1, 2024 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Special Issue: What can we do in Philosophy using Logic?)
Idioma: inglés
Enlaces
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Resumen
- Using semantic and syntactic methods, we prove the compatibility of the truth of universally quantified slurring sentences of the form [all Ss are Ns] or [all Ss are S*s] with the existential core of moral and semantic innocence. We also show that proving their mutual compatibility by means of logic leaves untouched the moral problem tied to their material truth. Finally, we trace the problem back to the failure to signal in the spelling of the slurring term’s meaning that the derogatory concept it denotes is not universally accepted.