Strategy-Proof Social Choice Correspondences and Single Peaked

• Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez ^[1]
  1. [1] Universidad Complutense de Madrid

     Universidad Complutense de Madrid

     Madrid, España

     
• Localización: Documentos de Trabajo (ICAE), ISSN-e 2341-2356, Nº. 2, 2024, págs. 1-19
• Idioma: inglés
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen

  • We examine social choice correspondences (SCCs) -mappings from preference profiles to sets of alternatives- that satisfy strategy-proofness and unanimity when individuals are endowed with single-peaked preferences over alternatives, preferences over sets are consistent with Expected Utility Theory, uniform prior probabilities, and Bayesian Updating. Leveraging the relation between SCCs and probabilistic decision schemes -mappings from preference profiles to lotteries over alternatives- we extend the results by Ingalagavi and Sadhukhan (2023, Journal of Mathematical Economics 109, 102912). In one-dimensional spaces of alternatives, only the union of two single-valued strategy-proof SCCs satisfy strategy-proofness and unanimity. In multi-dimensional convex spaces of alternatives, only unions of up to two dictatorships satisfy both properties.