Resumen de Investiture rules and the formation and type of government in Israel and Italy
This paper investigates the seemingly puzzling situation in which legislatorsvote against a government of which they will become a part. Why arelegislators from the coalition parties not fully disciplined in the investiturevote? Is it because of the type of government when the characteristics of theinvestiture vote is similar (a simple majority and an ex-post vote)? UsingIsrael and Italy as case studies, we demonstrate that when the type ofgovernment is an oversized coalition and the investiture consists of a simplemajority and an ex-post vote (as a constant), legislators will be willing to voteagainst their party. We argue that they do so to express their disappointmentwith the positions they are offered and/or the policies that the coalition isadopting. Given the simple majority and oversized coalition, they are riskinglittle and potentially reaping future rewards from their action.
