Drivers’ moves in Formula One Economics: A network analysis since 2000

• Mourao, Paulo Reis ^[1]
  1. [1] Departamento de Economía y NIPE, Escuela de Economía y Gestión, Universidad de Minho, Portugal.
• Localización: Sport TK: revista euroamericana de ciencias del deporte, ISSN 2254-4070, ISSN-e 2340-8812, Nº. 13, 2024
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • This paper explored the potentiality of social networks analysis to discuss the industrial organization of Formula One since the 2000 season. We tested three major hypotheses related to the centrality of championship teams, their selectiveness when observing drivers’ moves, and the role of certain explicative attributes. There are oligopolistic elements in Formula One, with champions adopting high values of betweenness centrality, sending and receiving drivers from some other teams and opting to exchange drivers and resources from other teams with not-so-competitive scuderias. Formula One teams that win the Constructors’ Championship tend to assume central roles in the network of drivers’ moves. Despite their centrality, these winning teams are very selective regarding the origin of the drivers they want to contract. There are more chances of contractual ties between teams which are not significantly close in terms of ranks or budgets.