To what extent does the cooperation of national parliaments and the EuropeanParliament strengthen the oversight of EU executive actors in the Area ofFreedom, Security and Justice? The article provides an ideal-typicalconceptualisation of individual and joint parliamentary oversight in the EU’smulti-level system. Legislative scrutiny is examined for the case of theGeneral Data Protection Regulation and agency oversight is analysed for thecase of Europol. In both cases, the article demonstrates that theinterparliamentary cooperation has not led to a joint oversight. Legislativescrutiny was badly timed, characterised by diverging interests, and a highfluctuation of the participating parliamentarians. The Joint ParliamentaryScrutiny Group over Europol has turned out to become a primarily symboliclayer to the‘individual oversight’exercised by the European Parliament’s LIBEcommittee.
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