Neurolaw between epistemology and ontology: phenomenology and cognitive neurosciences
- Autores: Davide Perrotta
- Localización: Aoristo: International Journal of Phenomenology, Hermeneutics and Metaphysics, ISSN-e 2526-592X, Vol. 4, 1 2, 2021 (Ejemplar dedicado a: CIRF - Sobre a fenomenologia e seu entorno), págs. 163-184
- Idioma: portugués
- Enlaces
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Resumen
In the first part of the paper, I present some problematic concepts in cognitive neuroscience, from aphilosophical point of view, like causality and Law. These concepts open ontological questions, thatwe develop proposing a mechanistic interpretation of cognitive neuroscience, compare to aphenomenological investigation of human experience. General descriptions of mental states andintentionality allow us to investigate different forms of causation, not reducible to “material causes”.By contrast, cognitive neurosciences are specialized to investigate the latter form, beinginterpretable both like a bound and an advantage. In the second part of the paper we will resort tothe presented epistemological descriptions in order to investigate social cognition. We will discussthe case or moral cognition in order to preserve emergent properties in the human experience, in acomplementary way with” cognitive mechanisms”. This argumentation will help us to better definethe Neurolaw field of researches, allowing us to discern different forms of responsibility of thehuman acts with regard to different causal factors.
