Bidding behavior in multi-unit auctions: an experimental investigation and some theoretical insights

• Autores: Dirk Engelmann, Veronika Grimm
• Localización: Working papers = Documentos de trabajo: Serie AD, Nº. 12, 2004, 55 págs.
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • We present laboratory experiments of five different multi-unit auction mechanisms. Two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned off among two bidders with flat demand for two units. We test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. Revenue equivalence is tested for these auctions as well as for the Ausubel, the Vickrey and the discriminatory sealed-bid auction. Furthermore, we compare the five mechanisms with respect to the efficient allocation of the units. We also provide some theoretical insights concerning the equilibria of uniform-price auctions with incomplete information.