Resumen de Scientific realism and nomological antirealism in Nancy Cartwright
The present communication performs a critical analysis of the main thesis that Nancy Cartwright supports related with the laws status, its explanatory function and the sources which they come from. It also explores thoroughly the relevance of the arguments supporting the thesis that Cartwright defends. Like other authors (George Molnar, Sphen Mumford) her proposal is included in the nomological antirealism, that is the conception which claims that laws lack an independent existence from our methodological procedures and cognitive processes that ultimately make the laws to emerge. It also is in favor of the existence of causal powers or capacities in nature, thereby assuming a realistic postulate. This paper attempts to show a conflict between the quasi-instrumental function assigned to the laws and their descriptive character of the properties and causal sequences. We believe that Cartwright's nomological antirrealism is not consistently inserted in her version of the scientific realism of entities.
