Resumen de Ēthos dia tou logou / Ēthos dia tōn ēthōn: La evaluación del carácter del argumentador
According to Aristotle’s “Rhetoric” (1356a9-10), “ēthos”, the orator’s character, should be analysed and evaluated through his discourse (“dia tou logou”), not through the previous information and opinions we may have about her acts and person (“alla mē dia to prodedoxasthai”). This caution is, in fact, an Aristotelian technical innovation on the typically Greek widespread rhetorical exploitation of the inconsistencies and contradictions between the speaker’s (or, for that matter, the opponent’s) words and deeds. The “Rhetoric to Alexander” a contemporary but allegedly more conventional treatise attributed to Anaximenes, is, for example, full of indications to this purpose, in its discussions about enthymemes, “tekmerion” proofs or proofs based on the “opinion about the speaker”. The contemporary discussions about complex notions of “ēthos”, either including o excluding aspects as biographical data, public “personae”, author’s discursive image etc. in the literary realm might help us clarify some of these issues. Conscious of the complexities of such possible “ontologies of authorship” or “ethotical ontologies”, I will claim that although Aristotle’s mandate should not be taken as a permanent rule (that would preclude the exposure, in the adequate contexts, of the speaker’s imposture), it is nevertheless a useful initial imperative of ethical value, acting as a rebuttable presumption about the speaker’s pragmatical consistency that will help us better understand her discourse and attend to certain characteristics about her speaking rights.
