Resumen de Natural Kind Thinking in Philosophy of Science: a Meta-theoretical Analysis
In a recent paper, Thomas Reydon (2010) argued for the importance of natural kind theory in philosophy of science and presented a meta-theoretical analysis of the current debate on natural kinds. Reydon identifies two lines of work or traditions that interpret and address the same philosophical problem differently, as each line of work is accompanied by a different set of assumptions and ideas. This paper is divided into two parts. In the first part, I shall present and examine critically Reydon's proposal and I shall point out certain aspects of his analysis that, should be improved. In particular, I consider two main problems on Reydon's analysis that show how this proposal is insufficient to account for the difficulties and disputes arising in the current debate on natural kinds. In the second part, I shall present an alternative proposal of a meta-theoretical analysis, which includes and develops some aspects of Reydon's analysis but introduces new elements in order to overcome its limitations. This new meta-theoretical analysis is based on a distinction between a metaphysical and a methodological approach, and I want to argue that this proposal is best suited a) for understanding the peculiarities and differences among theoretical approaches in the current philosophical discussion on natural kinds, i.e. the actual debate, and b) for explaining in what sense the notion of “natural kind” is ambiguous.
