Underdetermination, Realism, and Truth Approximation

• Autores: Gustavo Cevolani, Luca Tambolo
• Localización: VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science: Santiago de Compostela, Spain, 18-20 July 2012 / Sociedad de Lógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España (aut.), Concepción Martínez Vidal (dir. congr.), José L. Falguera López (dir. congr.), José Miguel Sagüillo Fernández-Vega (dir. congr.), Víctor Martín Verdejo Aparicio (dir. congr.), Martín Pereira Fariña (dir. congr.), 2012, ISBN 978-84-9887-939-1, págs. 374-381
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Held (2011) attacks scientific realism via a criticism of the No-Miracles Argument based on the underdetermination of theories. In this paper we argue that the No-Miracles Argument, when deployed in conjunction with non-naive versions of realism, based on the view that verisimilitude or truth approximation is the main cognitive aim of scientific inquiry, survives Held’s criticism unscathed.