Resumen de Carnap's Principle of Tolerance : Rejection or Neglect of Language
Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance holds that cognitive correctness does not enter into the choice of a language for science. For some, tolerance has significant appeal. However, tolerance’s philosophical underpinnings remain far from clear. This essay aims to identify the philosophical basis for tolerance within Carnap’s thought. §1 more carefully characterizes the kind of metaphysical intrusion into language construction that tolerance is supposed to preclude. §2 proposes a pragmatist account of tolerance. Pragmatism holds that language is an instrument for the fulfillment of a chosen aim. For Carnap, the aim of scientific language is the description and derivation of observation reports. From the pragmatist perspective, then, the reason the choice of a language is not subject to cognitive correctness is that cognitive correctness does not affect the language’s fulfillment of its function. §3 contrasts my pragmatist interpretation with non-factualist interpretations of tolerance. According to non-factualist interpretations, tolerance holds that there is no coherent standard of cognitive correctness for language choice. I argue that non-factualist accounts do not address all of the metaphysical arguments that in §1 I argued fall within the ambit of tolerance. I conclude that pragmatism is the preferable understanding of tolerance.
