Argumentación racional sin transmisión de la justificación

• Autores: Manuel Pérez Otero
• Localización: VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science: Santiago de Compostela, Spain, 18-20 July 2012 / Sociedad de Lógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España (aut.), Concepción Martínez Vidal (dir. congr.), José L. Falguera López (dir. congr.), José Miguel Sagüillo Fernández-Vega (dir. congr.), Víctor Martín Verdejo Aparicio (dir. congr.), Martín Pereira Fariña (dir. congr.), 2012, ISBN 978-84-9887-939-1, págs. 269-273
• Idioma: español
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• Resumen

  • Contemporary debates about scepticism, epistemic circularity and warrant transmission takes for granted the following thesis: when warrant transmission fails (so that one cannot acquire, by running an argument with warranted premises, a first warrant for its conclusion, or increase the previous warrant one had for it) the argument fails. I challenge this thesis. The discussion is illustrated with a diagnosis of Moore’s Proof of an External World. It can be seen as a good argument, even if warrant doesn’t transmit across it. In more general terms: an argument with conclusion C addressed to subject S can be cogent in the sense that the recognition that the premises entail (or make highly likely) C can foster in S the belief in C, without necessarily the warrant for C being gained (or reinforced) by such a recognition.