¿Es la tesis de la carga teórica de la observación incompatible con el dogmatismo?

• Autores: Mireia López Amo
• Localización: VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science: Santiago de Compostela, Spain, 18-20 July 2012 / Sociedad de Lógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España (aut.), Concepción Martínez Vidal (dir. congr.), José L. Falguera López (dir. congr.), José Miguel Sagüillo Fernández-Vega (dir. congr.), Víctor Martín Verdejo Aparicio (dir. congr.), Martín Pereira Fariña (dir. congr.), 2012, ISBN 978-84-9887-939-1, págs. 253-260
• Idioma: español
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• Resumen

  • The goal of this paper is to show, against Pryor, that the theory-ladenness of observation is incompatible with his dogmatist proposal about perceptual justification. I will present dogmatism through two differentiated thesis, Immediacy (IMM) and Sufficiency (SUF), and I will argue that although the theoryladenness of observation under certain interpretation is compatible with (IMM), it is not compatible with (SUF). Thus, it cannot be said, as Pryor does, that the theory-landenness of observation is unproblematic for dogmatism.