Resumen de Decisiones epistémicas y los límites del naturalismo
The paper analyses an argument according to which the existence of epistemic decisions would pose a crucial problem for naturalism. The argument is the following one. We could adopt a naturalistic perspective in many fields. We could adopt such a perspective even in fields such as those of morality and action. However, we could not adopt a naturalistic perspective with respect to the fact that we are able to adopt epistemic decisions. To adopt a naturalistic perspective with respect to our epistemic decisions would preempt the very fact of adopting such a perspective. Epistemic decisions have to necessarilly incorporate a certain feeling of spontaneity that would be cancelled if a naturalist perspective were to be adopted. We distinguish a direct version and a modalized version of the argument. And we construe a thought experiment to illustrate the situation generated by them. In that thought experiment, the condition of being like an “epistemic puppet” is contrasted with the condition of being like an “agentive, evaluative and normative puppet”.
