Boghossian’s Argument from Inference and Identity Belief Ascriptions

• Autores: Ekain Garmendia Mujika
• Localización: VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science: Santiago de Compostela, Spain, 18-20 July 2012 / Sociedad de Lógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España (aut.), Concepción Martínez Vidal (dir. congr.), José L. Falguera López (dir. congr.), José Miguel Sagüillo Fernández-Vega (dir. congr.), Víctor Martín Verdejo Aparicio (dir. congr.), Martín Pereira Fariña (dir. congr.), 2012, ISBN 978-84-9887-939-1, págs. 198-204
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Boghossian proposed an argument against mental externalism, which claims that if externalism were true our de dicto ascriptions could not offer the rational explanations we expect from them. Here I present and defend an answer to this argument. I claim that the externalist can indeed offer good explanations if she makes use of identity belief ascriptions. In order to defend such a proposal from some possible problems, I superficially characterize a model about what it is to engage in an inference and what it is to offer a rational explanation.