A first-person account, a description, explanation, or theory, is an account of experience or actions from the perspective of the person having the experience or performing the actions. A first-person account is really for that first person, and can only be evaluated from the perspective of the person whose account it is. A third-person account is the same for everyone, and can be evaluated from a neutral, or impersonal standpoint. Certain ethical theories and logical theories have an essentially first-person character. This does not make them capricious or subjective, for a first-person theory can be governed by objective principles which are the same for everyone. The theories of illocutionary logic, the logic of speech acts, are essentially first-person theories. These theories explore, both semantically and deductively, the commitments generated by performing assertive illocutionary acts. The present paper argues that even standard logical theories are first-person theories. They have, superficially, the appearance of third-person theories, but they are actually truncated and abstract versions of explicitly first-person theories.
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