A Landscape of Logics beyond the Deduction Theorem (and Moore’s Paradox)

• Bas C. van Fraassen ^[1]
  1. [1] San Francisco State University

     San Francisco State University

     Estados Unidos

     
• Localización: Principia: an international journal of epistemology, ISSN-e 1808-1711, Vol. 26, Nº. 1 (Models and Modeling in the Sciences), 2022, págs. 25-38
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Philosophical issues often turn into logic. That is certainly true of Moore’s Paradox, which tends to appear and reappear in many philosophical contexts. There is no doubt that its study belongs to pragmatics rather than semantics or syntax. But it is also true that issues in pragmatics can often be studied fruitfully by attending to their projection, so to speak, onto the levels of semantics or syntax — just in the way that problems in spherical geometry are often illuminated by the study of projections onto a plane. To begin I will describe a potentially vast landscape of logics of a certain form, with some illustrations of how they appear naturally in response to some problems in philosophical logic. Then I will turn Moore’s Paradox into logic, within that landscape, and show how far it can be illuminated therein.