Conant’s B Deduction. Some Remarks on "Why Kant is not a Kantian"
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Luigi Filieri [1]
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[1] University of Pisa
University of Pisa
Pisa, Italia
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- Localización: Giornale di Metafisica: revista bimestrale di filosofia, ISSN 0017-0372, Vol. 44, Nº. 1, 2022 (Ejemplar dedicado a: La metafisica di Pittsburgh e l’eredità kantiana / coord. por Angelo Cicatello, Danilo Manca), págs. 94-111
- Idioma: inglés
- Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
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Resumen
The aim of this paper is to reconstruct the key points of Conant’s reading of the B Deduction and critically discuss some tenets of his conceptualist view of Kant’s account of cognition. Conant’s reading has several interpretative merits: its criticism of the layer-cake conception of the mind, its comprehensive approach to Kant’s text, and the explanatory reciprocity between sensibility and the understanding. Yet it argues for the interdependence of the two faculties in cognition on both the transcendental and the empirical level. Instead, I argue that for Kant the self-standing intelligibility of each faculty in transcendental analysis is the necessary condition of their synthetic connection within the boundaries of possible experience.
