Cualidades secundarias y autoconocimiento

• Vergara, Julia ^[1]
  1. [1] Universidad de Buenos Aires

     Universidad de Buenos Aires

     Argentina

     
• Localización: Análisis Filosófico, ISSN 0326-1301, ISSN-e 1851-9636, Vol. 17, Nº. 1, 1997, págs. 5-25
• Idioma: español
• Enlaces
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• Resumen

  • Self-knowledge as a sort ofknowledge can be justified through two kinds of paradigm: obser\vational and inferential. This paper criticizes both epistemic lines and suggests instead that first-person statements exhibit the samc logical structure as statements about secondary qualities, as proposed by Crispin Wright. The paper introduces a variant to this propasa!: self-deception should not be seen as threatening tht: biconditional that expresses that self-knowledge is constitutive of intentionality. This is the constitutive thesis.