La autonomía y el yo demente

• Dworkin, Ronald ^[1]
  1. [1] New York University

     New York University

     Estados Unidos

     
• Localización: Análisis Filosófico, ISSN 0326-1301, ISSN-e 1851-9636, Vol. 17, Nº. 2, 1997 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Bioética), págs. 145-156
• Idioma: español
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Resumen

  • In this article the author considers the rights, not of someone who was bom and always been demented, but of someone who has been competent in the past. He asks if a competent person's right to autonomy includes the power to dictate that life prolonging treatment be denied him later, even ifhe, when demented, pleads for it. To answer this question he considers the extension of contemporary and precedent autonomy and the consequences holding an evidentiary view or the integrity perspective of autonomy implies.