Escepticismo semántico y teorías del significado

• Comesaña, Juan Manuel ^[1]
  1. [1] Universidad de Buenos Aires

     Universidad de Buenos Aires

     Argentina

     
• Localización: Análisis Filosófico, ISSN 0326-1301, ISSN-e 1851-9636, Vol. 18, Nº. 2, 1998, págs. 143-149
• Idioma: español
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Resumen

  • In severa] works H. Putnam has developed an argument addressed against "realist" semantic theories (in particular, against causal theories of reference ). In this paper I argue that Putnam's argument is weaker than what is generally supposed, as Devitt has shown in Realism and Truth. I disagree, however, with Devitfs latest strategy against model-theoretic arguments as presented in an ''Afterword'' to that book.