Inconmensurabilidad y neutralidad teórica: algunas contribuciones actuales

• Gentile, Nélida ^[1]
  1. [1] Universidad de Buenos Aires

     Universidad de Buenos Aires

     Argentina

     
• Localización: Análisis Filosófico, ISSN 0326-1301, Vol. 19, Nº. 1, 1999, págs. 65-82
• Idioma: español
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• Resumen

  • In the early 80's the problem of incommensurability was reavived around of semantic holism versus causal realism discussion. In "Observation Reconsidered", Jerry Fodor argues -against Hanson, Kuhn and Feyerabend- the neutral character of perception judgments. Four years after Churchland writes "Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality: a Reply to Jerry Fodor". The objections are examined and answered again by Fodor in "A Reply To Churchland's 'Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality"'. In this paper I analyze the more relevan! aspects of this dispute and attempt to show the scarcity ofthe evidence available to solve the question. In a final section, however, I examine the conception holded by Michael Bishop that, in rny opinion, represents an interesting perspective in support for the Fodor's conclusions.